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DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF A SURVEY TO ASSESS SAFETY CULTURE
IN AIRLINE MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS1
Alyssa Mitchell Gibbons
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Champaign, Illinois
Terry L. von Thaden
Aviation Human Factors Division – University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Savoy, Illinois
Douglas A. Wiegmann
Aviation Human Factors Division – University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Savoy, Illinois
This paper describes the development and validation of a survey to assess safety culture in airline maintenance
operations according to the five-factor model of safety culture proposed by Wiegmann et al. (2002). Maintenance
technicians at two FAR Part 121 scheduled passenger airlines (N = 109 and 76) completed the original version of
the survey. The results yielded useful diagnostic information about the safety culture of each airline, but factor
analyses indicated that the five-factor model may not be adequate to describe the data. A more complex model is
proposed and modifications to the survey are suggested.
Safety Culture
Aviation organizations are becoming highly
interested in understanding safety culture and how it
can be improved. Safety culture can be defined as
“the enduring value and priority placed on worker
and public safety by everyone in every group at every
level of an organization” (Wiegmann, Zhang, von
Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002). Wiegmann et al.
(2002) reviewed the safety culture literature across a
number of industries and identified five critical
indicators of an organization’s safety culture:
Organizational Commitment (OC): the
organization’s commitment to safety, as expressed by
upper management;
Managerial Involvement (MI): the active involvement
of mid-level managers or supervisors in promoting
safety;
Employee Empowerment (EE): the degree to which
individual employees are empowered to make safety a
priority;
Accountability System (AS): the system by which
employees are held accountable for acting unsafely;
and
Reporting System (RS): the quality and usability of the
system for reporting and processing safety information.
While strength in one area can compensate to some
extent for deficiency in another (e.g., strong

employee empowerment may limit the negative
impact of poor management involvement), strength in
all areas is the hallmark of a culture that truly
promotes safety to the fullest.
Commercial Aviation Safety Survey
The Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS)
was developed, based on the five-factor model
described above, to assist airlines in diagnosing
strengths and weaknesses within their safety cultures
so that the weaknesses can be addressed. The flight
operations version of the CASS was created first,
with items based on existing safety culture
inventories from a number of industries. Wiegmann,
von Thaden, Mitchell, Sharma, & Zhang (2003)
provide a detailed description of the development of
the flight operations survey. The development of the
maintenance survey is the focus of the present report.
The maintenance version of the survey is designed to
reflect the same structure as the flight operations
version (that is, the same five indicators of safety
culture), but to use terminology and describe
behavior appropriate to the maintenance function.
Several steps were taken to develop the survey in
such a way that it paralleled the structure of the flight
operations survey but contained items directly
relevant to maintenance professionals. The flight
operations survey contained 89 items. Thirty-eight of
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At the time that the maintenance survey was being
developed, one preliminary test of the flight
operations survey had already been conducted, so
general feedback from that test was incorporated into
the revisions. Apparently confusing or ambiguous
items were excluded, as were items that did not
appear to have clear parallels in maintenance
operations. Additional items were chosen and/or
written to fill in the gaps left by the excluded items.
The original safety culture inventories used to create
the flight operations survey were consulted again, to
see whether we had overlooked any items appropriate
for maintenance. This search yielded six items.
Twenty new items were written based on the
extensive airline maintenance experience of one of
the researchers, who pointed out situations and
attitudes common in such an environment.

hundred and nine of the Airline A surveys and 76 of
the Airline B surveys were returned, for response
rates of 13% and 26% respectively. At Airline A,
most respondents (74%) described their primary job
responsibility as “Aircraft Technician;” at Airline B,
respondents were more evenly divided between
technicians (40%) and supervisory positions (Line
Manager, Lead Technician, Inspector, or Manager;
51% combined).
Dimension Scores. Scores for each airline were
calculated for each of the five dimensions of safety
culture as the mean of participants’ responses to the
items in each dimension scale. Items indicating a
negative safety culture (e.g., “My airline is more
concerned with making money than being safe.”)
were reverse coded. All five scales showed
acceptable levels of reliability for both airlines ( =
.74 – .94). Dimension scores for both airlines appear
in Figure 1.
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these were judged as applicable for maintenance with
minimal revisions. An additional 13 items were
modified more extensively to reflect the intent of
each original flight operations item in a maintenance
context. For example, the item “management expects
pilots to push the weather” was replaced by the item
“supervisors never pressure inspectors to sign-off on
borderline work.” Maintenance technicians are not at
all likely to encounter the scenario described in the
first item, but both items represent the same basic
idea: a specific, common situation in which the
responsible manager pressures a subordinate to
behave in an unsafe manner.
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Initial Results from Two Airlines
Maintenance personnel from two FAR Part 121
passenger airlines completed the survey. Participants
returned surveys directly to the researchers. They were
assured that their responses would remain confidential
and they were not asked to provide their names or other
personally identifying information. No compensation
was offered to participants or their organizations.
A total of 1148 surveys were distributed: 860 to
employees of Airline A and 288 to Airline B. One
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The final version of the maintenance survey
contained 84 items. As in the flight operations
survey, respondents were instructed to use a 7-point
Likert-type response scale to indicate their agreement
or disagreement with each item. A rating of 1
indicated that the respondent “strongly disagree(d)”
with the item and a rating of 7 indicated that he or
she “strongly agree(d).” The center point of the rating
scale, 4, was labeled “neither agree nor disagree.”
Space was provided beside each item for respondents
to write comments if they chose.
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Figure 1. CASS scores for two FAR Part 121 airlines.
Both of these airlines appear to have “middle-of-theroad” safety cultures, with scores near the neutral
point (4.0) in most areas. However, the pattern of the
dimension scores suggests different areas of strength
and weakness for each airline, implying that the
actual safety cultures experienced by employees are
quite different. Reporting systems are strong at both
airlines; they are the strongest area at Airline A,
while organizational commitment is Airline B’s
strongest dimension. Airline A needs improvement in
supervisory involvement, while Airline B needs to
improve its accountability system. Analyses of
individual item responses and respondent comments
further supported these overall impressions. All
scales were negatively correlated with technicians’
perceptions of risk at both airlines. The maintenance
CASS appears to be a useful diagnostic tool. The
items can be grouped together into reliable scales to
provide a broad-level picture of the organization or
analyzed individually to identify specific strengths
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and weaknesses, providing useful information to
airline management seeking to improve safety
culture.
Factor Analysis of the Maintenance CASS
Analytical Strategy
To validate the five-dimensional model of safety
culture proposed above, we conducted confirmatory
factor analyses (CFAs) using the Mx software
package (Neale, 2002). We conducted an overall
CFA for the five factor model and then tested singlefactor models for each of the five dimension scales
individually. In all analyses, model fit was tested by
considering the overall chi-squared value for the
model (X2), the root mean squared error of
approximation (RMSEA), the normed fit index
(NFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) and the relative
noncentrality index (RNI; see Neale, Boker, Xie, &
Maes, 2004 for definitions and citations for all fit
indices). Models are usually considered to fit well
when the X2 value is nonsignificant compared to the
degrees of freedom, the RMSEA is below .10, and
the NFI, TLI, and RNI are above .90 (McDonald &
Ho, 2002). Given the relatively small sample used in
this study, we considered a model to fit well when
most of these criteria were met.
If a model did not fit well, we considered the matrix
of residual discrepancies between the observed
correlation matrix and that expected under the model.
When an item showed large residual correlations (>
.15) with other items, we considered whether the item
might have been confusing or ambiguous, whether it
was highly correlated with only one other item
(introducing instability into the model), or whether it
showed a pattern of large residuals with other items
that might suggest the existence of another factor. In
the first two cases, the item was discarded and the fit
of the model without that item was assessed. In the
third case, items were grouped logically into
subfactors and the fit of the new multifactor model
was assessed. Improvement in fit was assessed by
means of chi-squared difference tests, which compare
the fit of the original model with the fit of the revised
model. A significant difference implies that the
revised model fits significantly better than did the
original model. If the large residuals within a scale
could not be resolved through these methods,
exploratory factor analyses (EFAs) were conducted
using the COFA (see McDonald, 1999) software
program to determine whether multiple factors were
needed to describe the data. Exploratory factor
analyses
were
subsequently
retested
with
confirmatory factor analyses so that the fit obtained
could be compared to that of the original models.

The data from Airline A were used in the initial
analyses, because the small sample size from Airline
B was not sufficient to allow a test of the full model.
The data from Airline B were used as a crossvalidation sample for the revised versions of the
individual factor scales.
Overall Model Fit. The first model tested was the one
hypothesized: a five-factor solution with each item
loading on the dimension it was intended to measure.
This model fit the data poorly: X22765 = 5660.27, p <
.01; RMSEA = .11; NFI = .30; TLI = .43; RNI = .45.
Further, 10% of the residual correlations had absolute
values greater than .15. One possible explanation for
the poor fit of the five-factor model is that
respondents did not discriminate between dimensions
of safety culture when completing the survey, but
rather based their responses on their overall
perception of the safety culture as good or bad. If this
were the case, a single-factor model in which all
items simply reflect the overall positive or negative
safety culture of the organization would fit well. The
single-factor model also fit poorly, however: X22774 =
5711.40, p<.01; RMSEA = .11. In fact, the fit of the
single-factor model was significantly poorer than that
for the five-factor model, X29 = 51.14, p < .01.As
the data could not be described by either the fivefactor model or a single general factor, the dimension
scales were analyzed individually to identify specific
sources of misfit.
Accountability System. The single-factor model for
the accountability system scale showed acceptable
fit: X227 = 32.93, p=.20; RMSEA = .05, NFI = .84,
TLI = .95, RNI = .96. Examination of the residuals
suggested that two pairs of items shared particularly
high correlations, implying that the items in each pair
may measure the same thing to such an extent as to
be redundant. However, removing one item from
each pair did not significantly improve the fit of the
model, so the items were retained. Cross-validation
with data from Airline B showed reasonably
acceptable fit, X227 = 48.75, p=.01; RMSEA = .11;
NFI = .87; TLI = .91; RNI = .94.
Reporting System. The single factor model showed
acceptable fit for the reporting system scale, X235 =
42.63, p = .18; RMSEA = .05; NFI = .85; TLI = .96;
RNI = .97. Low correlations between two pairs of
items resulted in high residuals (> .15) for those
pairs, but as all four items had high correlations with
the other items in the scale and the overall fit of the
model was good, they were retained. However, in the
cross-validation sample from Airline B, the singlefactor model did not fit as well, X235 = 70.13, p = .00;
RMSEA = .12; NFI = .75; TLI = .81; RNI = .85.
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Removing the item “I am familiar with the system for
formally reporting safety issues in my airline”
improved the fit of the model in the Airline B sample,
X227 = 49.86, p = .01; RMSEA = .11; X28 = 20.26,
p<.01; NFI = .80; TLI = .86; RNI = .89; and
removing it from the Airline A data improved the fit
slightly, but not significantly X227 = 33.54, p = .18;
RMSEA = .05; X28 = 9.10, p = .33. In light of that
evidence, the item was retained.
Supervisory Involvement. The initial single factor
model did not quite fit the supervisory involvement
scale well, X277 = 108.78, p = .01; RMSEA = .07;
NFI = .83; TLI = .93; RNI = .94. Examination of the
residual matrix indicated that a large number of the
discrepancies were related to two items. Respondent
comments on one of the items indicated that the item
was interpreted differently by different respondents,
but the reason for the misfit of the other item was
unclear. Removing both items, however, improved
the fit of the model, so that the model containing
twelve items fit acceptably, X254 = 63.59, p = .17;
RMSEA = .04; X211 = 24.11, p = .01; NFI = .85;
TLI = .95; RNI = .96. In the Airline B sample, the fit
of the twelve-item model was similar, but not quite
so good, X254 = 84.73, p < .01; RMSEA = .09; NFI =
.80; TLI = .90; RNI = .92.
Employee Empowerment. The single factor model for
the employee empowerment scale did not fit particularly
well, X254 = 87.42, p<.01; RMSEA = .08, NFI = .73,
TLI = .84, RNI = .87. An attempt to separate the items
into two factors (technicians’ authority to improve
safety and their safety professionalism) based on large
residuals and logical relationships among items yielded
only slightly improved fit (X253 = 76.26, p = .02;
RMSEA = .07) and a further division into three factors
(authority, professionalism, and peer influence) did not
fit better (X251 = 75.50, p = .01; RMSEA = .07).
Consequently, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was
conducted to investigate the structure of the scale. A
three-factor model was tested first, because the threefactor model suggested above showed (though barely)
the best fit of the three. The promax rotated solution
identified three factors that were in many ways similar
to the three factors suggested by conceptual grouping.
The first factor appears to reflect supervisors’ respect for
technicians in safety matters (authority), the second
describes technicians’ personal pride in upholding safety
standards (professionalism), and the third indicates a
peer culture that supports safety (peer influence). In a
CFA, this model showed acceptable fit, X251 = 65.56, p
= .08; RMSEA = .05. One conceptual difficulty
remained in that two items, “Everyone routinely
performs the operational checks after the work is
completed,” and “Everyone routinely re-inspects each

other's work or has someone inspect their work before
return to service,” were clearly similar in content, but
loaded on different factors. However, the former item
had near-equal loadings (.26 and .25, respectively) on
both the professionalism and peer culture factors.
Moving this item to the peer culture factor actually
slightly improved the fit of the model, X251 = 61.14, p =
.16; RMSEA = .05. In the interest of parsimony, a
second exploratory analysis was conducted requesting
only two factors. The factors identified by the promax
rotation were identical to those suggested by the
conceptual two-factor grouping. As that model had
already been shown to fit poorly, the three-factor model
for the employee empowerment dimension was
retained.
The three-factor model appeared to fit the crossvalidation data from Airline B well, X251 = 45.54,
p=.69; RMSEA = .00. However, some of the fit
indices were inappropriately high: NFI = .75; TLI =
1.06; RNI = 1.05. This suggests empirical
underidentification, a condition that occurs when the
observed correlations between variables in a sample
are near zero. This is most likely a function of the
small Airline B sample size, but it prevents us from
being able to draw conclusions about the crosssample validity of the three-factor employee
empowerment model.
Organizational Commitment. The single-factor model
did not fit the data well for the organizational
commitment scale, X2434 = 732.23, p < .01; RMSEA
= .08; NFI = .55; TLI = .73; RNI = .75. Of the 465
residual correlations, ninety-nine were greater than
.10, with 34 greater than .15. This suggests that a
multi-factor model is necessary to describe the items
in this scale – such pervasive residuals are not likely
to be resolved by removing a few items. To identify a
starting point for conceptually grouping these items,
we looked to the parallel analysis that had previously
been conducted for the flight operations survey. That
investigation used an exploratory factor analysis to
identify three factors: upper management attitude
toward safety, use of preventive safety practices
(such as safety training), and commitment of
organizational resources to safety. The maintenance
items were correspondingly grouped into similar
factors and a three-factor model was tested. However,
that model showed only small (but significant)
improvement in fit over the single-factor model, X2431
= 704.48, p = .00; RMSEA = .08.
A series of EFAs was then conducted using COFA.
Two-, three-, four-, and five-factor solutions were
tested, but the four-factor model showed the best fit
in subsequent CFAs: X2399 = 550.69, p = .00; RMSEA
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= .06, with 21 residuals greater than .15. Fit indices
for this model approached acceptable levels, NFI =
.69, TLI = .88, RNI = .89. The first three factors in
this model appeared to represent management
attitude (e.g., “Unsafe behavior is not tolerated in my
company”), allocation of resources (e.g., “Tool
control, calibration, and equipment certification are
closely monitored by my company”), and quality of
safety training. .The fourth factor contained only
three items, and no conceptual relationship between
these was readily apparent, except perhaps that all
were rather indirect assessments of safety culture. As
this factor was not clearly interpretable and may have
simply consisted of poor items, another confirmatory
analysis was conducted excluding those three items
(and thus the fourth factor). This new three-factor
model (consisting of attitude, resource, and training
factors) did not yield a significant improvement in fit
over the four-factor model (X2321 = 475.63, p = .00;
RMSEA = .07; X278 = 75.05, p=.57). However, in
the revised model, it became apparent that many of
the large residuals were associated with one item.
Excluding this item from the new three-factor model
resulted in a significant improvement in fit for that
model (X2296 = 421.30, p = .00; RMSEA = .07; X225
= 54.33, p<.01), and the resulting model also fit
significantly better than the four-factor model ( X2103
= 129.38, p=.04). Fit indices for this model were
similar to those for the four-factor model, NFI = .72,
TLI = .88, RNI = .89. Eight large (> .15) residuals
remained, but no item was connected with more than
one of these, and no logical connections between
pairs of items sharing large residuals were apparent.
The revised three-factor model (attitude, resources,
and training) was retained.
Again, data from Airline B were used to crossvalidate the revised model. The three-factor model
did not fit particularly well, X2296 = 480.08, p = .00;
RMSEA = .10, NFI = .61; TLI = .77; RNI = .79. This
suggests that these factors should be used with
caution in future research, as they may reflect
idiosyncratic characteristics of Airline A rather than
the general structure of organizational commitment
across airlines.
Revised Model Overall Fit. When all revisions are
taken into account, the new model contains a total of
nine factors (the organizational commitment and
employee empowerment scales were each divided
into three factors). The original survey contained
seventy-six items, but seven items were deleted in the
revision process, so the revised model contained only
sixty-nine. A confirmatory factor analysis was
conducted to test the fit of the revised model. Again,
however, the full model did not fit particularly well,

X22246 = 4099.49, p < .01; RMSEA = .10; NFI = .38;
TLI = .54; RNI = .56. While these values represent an
improvement in fit compared to the original model,
they still fall short of acceptable levels. Of the 2415
residuals, 231 (9.6%) had absolute values above .15.
To determine whether the observed improvement in
fit was due to the regrouping of items or merely to
the elimination of poor items, an additional
confirmatory factor analysis was conducted using
only the sixty-nine items in the revised model but
grouping them into the original five factors. Again,
this model fit poorly overall, X22267 = 4236.75, p <
.01; RMSEA = .10. The fit of the revised (ninefactor) model was significantly better than that of this
five-factor model, X221 = 137.26, p < .01, but
comparison of the other fit indices (NFI = .36; TLI =
.52; RNI = .54.) suggests that the difference is slight.
Conclusions
While the results of the factor analysis generally
supported the three of the five factors, the organizational
commitment and employee empowerment factors
remained problematic, and even the revised complete
model did not show a good fit to the data. These
findings are consistent, however, with the corresponding
analysis of the flight operations survey. That survey also
indicated a need to divide organizational commitment
and employee empowerment into three subfactors each,
and the subfactors identified in that analysis correspond
conceptually in many ways to the subfactors identified
here. The correspondence is not exact, but these findings
do suggest two conclusions: (1) While the
accountability system, reporting system, and
management/supervisory involvement scales appear to
represent well-defined, unitary constructs, the
pilot/employee empowerment and organizational
commitment scales represent more complex phenomena
that require further consideration; and (2) within those
two scales, several consistent themes emerge that
provide insight into how those constructs might be
better defined in future.
Specifically, the concept of employee (or pilot)
empowerment seems to encompass several distinct
elements: the authority granted to employees by the
organization, the authority and personal responsibility
assumed by employees, and the positive or negative
impacts of the peer culture regarding safety. With
respect to organizational commitment, respondents in
both flight operations and maintenance appeared to
distinguish between the “talk” (statements and policies)
and the “walk” (actions and commitment of resources)
of their organizations.
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The analysis of the flight operations survey
concluded with a conceptual revision of the scale,
based on input from the factor analysis and from
respondent comments. For example, the pilot
empowerment subfactors were linked with the
accountability system factor as aspects of an
“Informal Safety System” second-order factor and
the reporting system was similarly divided to indicate
different parts of the reporting process. Given the
strong conceptual similarity between the flight
operations analysis and the results reported here, we
considered whether a similar structure could be
adopted for the maintenance survey. Again, we
considered respondents’ comments as well as the
factor analyses to identify problematic items or areas
of concern to technicians that might have been
overlooked in the original survey. The revised model
for maintenance appears in Table 1.
Table 1. Revised model of safety culture maintenance.
Construct
Overall
Safety
Culture

Factors
Organizational
Commitment

Subfactors
Safety Values
Safety Fundamentals
Work Environment
Safety Training

Supervisors

Supervisory
Involvement
Maintaining Standards

Informal
Safety System

Accountability
Technicians’ Authority
Professionalism

Formal Safety
System

Reporting System
Response & Feedback
Safety Personnel

The informal safety system and reporting system
factors from the revised flight operations survey were
retained for the revised maintenance version. For the
organizational commitment factor, the safety values
and safety fundamentals subfactors from the flight
operations survey were kept, but subfactors for safety
training and a safe work environment were added. The
supervisory involvement factor was retitled
“Supervisors” and contained only two subfactors:
supervisory involvement and “maintaining standards”.
This latter subfactor referred to supervisors’ consistent
enforcement of high safety standards.
This
reorganization required the creation of several new,
specific items to ensure that each subfactor had enough
items to be stable in future analyses. Items were also
excluded if they seemed less relevant than or
redundant with other items in the same scale. We also

revised item wording wherever it appeared that an item
might have been ambiguous or confusing.
While this initial test of the maintenance version of
the CASS did not provide solid support for the fivefactor model of safety culture, it nevertheless
provided useful information on which further
revisions can be based. The five scales proved useful
as a diagnostic tool for identifying strengths and
weaknesses of two airlines’ safety cultures. Detailed
factor analyses indicated that the accountability
system, reporting system, and supervisory
involvement factors represented fairly unitary
constructs, which the employee empowerment and
organizational commitment factors were more
complex. As this is consistent with the findings of the
flight operations survey, it seems likely that this
reflects true complexity in the construct rather than
only measurement error. When combined with
respondents’ substantive comments on the items, the
factor analyses yielded information that was useful in
creating a revised model of maintenance safety
culture parallel to that created for flight operations .
This new model formed the basis for an extensive
revision to the maintenance CASS that may be tested
in future research.
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